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NSC BRIEFING

13 May 1954

VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT FACES DISINTEGRATION

- I. Bao Dai government, competing Geneva with highly organized Viet Minh regime, is split and virtually at standstill.
 - A. Bao Dai and two thirds his ministers in Europe; two senior members still in Saigon at loggerheads.
- II. Tonkin governor asserted 6 May Vietnam no longer had central government.
 - A. Only solution he saw was Bao
 Dai's return to become premier.
 - B. But it doubtful Bao Dai's direction government would remedy situation.

State Dept. review completed

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- C. Anyway, he said recently it was his duty "to remain for some time in Europe to defend Vietnam on the international scale."
- III. Paralysis of government in Saigon illustrated by fact "war cabinet" established 9 April had but one meeting.
 - A. This body includes Premier Buu

 Loc, Defense Minister Quat, and

 Chief of Staff General High.
 - B. Latter two long been at odds.
 - IV. Shortly after formation, war cabinet issued general mobilization order.
 - A. But four weeks later, on 3 May,

 Hinh alleged that orders necessary to carry out decree been
 held up by Quat.
 - B. Quat denies and blames Hinh.

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- C. The premier, who might have mediated, was in Paris.
- O. Meanwhile, conscious of this animosity, the army is steadily deteriorating.
- V. Apart from its anomolous position regarding independence, weakness of Vietnam government been due to Bao Dai's influence.
 - A. He refuses all demands for a constitution or assembly and delegates authority to competing subordinates.
 - B. This pattern been varied by heavy-handed intervention when he sees a subordinate's strength developing.

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- VI. Striking example Bao Dai's practice iniquitous intervention was decree 1 May giving control national police to a paramilitary, quasi-gangster organization.
 - A. This group, the Binh Xuyen, controls most important gambling concessions Saigon. Has been important source funds for Bao Dai.
 - 1. About half million of
 Bao Dai's annual income
 \$7-8,000,000 comes from
 this source.
 - B. Binh Xuyen considered antiCommunist--long as antiCommunism profitable--but its
 clevation has seriously
 demoralized the sureté.

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SEGRET

- C. Rumors current that other

 Binh Xuyen leaders will get

 government jobs, even including governorship Cochinchina.
- VII. Binh Xuyen affair heightened conflict between Hinh and Quat.
 - A. 200 sureté officers resigned, joined with Hinh, taking along their files.
 - B. Hinh hinted 7 May be would be files for political curious through a military control service be will set as
 - C. Quat states Hinh plans Gestapo.
- VIII. Present situation now seems more one of paralysis than disintegration.

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- A. But suggestion of latter in action of pope politicoreligious Cao Dai sect in Cochinchina. On 3 May he broadcast appeal to Ho Chi Minh for coalition against partition Vietnam.
- B. This group has 10,000 armed men that been scheduled for integration into Vietnam army.
- c. American embassy points out

 pope's appeal has increased

 forces of division and given

 impetus to steadily deterioration,

 political situation.
- D. This deterioration also reflected in recent remarks by Vietnamese labor minister who lived in Viet Minh area until '50.

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- 1. He expressed total disillusionment with
 "corrupt and totally
 unrepresentative" Bao
 Dai government; asked
 what American attitude
 would be if attempt made
 to set up "revolutionary
 government."
- 2. He said population in

 Viet Minh area opposed

 to Viet Minh but would

 revolt rather than put

 up with Bao Dai.